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PRIVACY IMPLICATIONS OF CONSUMER
CREDIT PROTECTION LAWS
PAUL B. RASOR*

I.

INTRODUCTION

One of the most important attributes of a right of privacy is the
right to control information about oneself. Privacy issues naturally
arise in the consumer credit process because this process is one of
gathering and evaluating information about individuals. Consumer
credit legislation such as the federal Consumer Credit Protection
Act (CCPA)1 has an impact on this process. The CCPA can be
viewed as a statute designed primarily to regulate the flow of information in consumer credit transactions. Seen from this perspective,
its privacy contours become more easily visible. This article maps
out and evaluates some of the uncharted privacy topography of the
2
CCPA.
While several different privacy issues can be identified in the
consumer credit process, this article will address only two.3 The first
* Professor of Law, Washburn University School of Law. B. Mus., University of
Michigan, 1968; J.D., University of Michigan, 1972. Much of the research for this
article was originally undertaken for a chapter on financial privacy to be included in
PRIVACY LAW AND PRACTICE, a three-volume treatise scheduled for publication in 1986
by Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., under the auspices of the Center for Information
Technology and Privacy Law, The John Marshall Law School [hereinafter cited as
PRIVACY TREATISE]. As a result, there are some unavoidable similarities between the
text of this article and the treatise. To avoid footnote clutter, I have not specifically
noted every instance where this occurs.
1. 15 U.S.C. §1601 (1982).
2. A few parts of the CCPA address consumer privacy directly, and these have
been discussed repeatedly in the legal literature. The most obvious example is the
Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. §1681 (1982), which is Title VI of the
CCPA, and in which privacy protection is an express and overriding concern. See,
e.g., Note, Protecting Privacy in Credit Reporting, 24 STAN. L. REV. 550 (1972). I do
not propose to repeat that work here. Instead, i wish to address the hidden impacts
of those CCPA provisions which were not intended to evoke privacy.
3. There are other privacy issues which can be identified in the consumer credit
process. Disclosure is an example. One could evaluate the rules which limit the ability
of institutions to share the information they accumulate. I have omitted discussion of
this issue because the only CCPA provision which addresses it is the FCRA, and it
does so directly. See supra note 2. For detailed treatment, see PRIVACY TREATISE,

supra note *. Another important issue is government access. This issue is beyond the
scope of this article. For further discussion, see PRIVACY TREATISE, supra note *; Ra-

sor, Controlling Government Access to Personal FinancialRecords, 25 WASHBURN
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is content: What information do institutions gather about consumers? The second is access: To what extent do the individuals about
whom the information pertains have access to and control over that
information? The CCPA affects both of these issues.
The legal issues cannot be grasped without some understanding
of the underlying transactional processes. Accordingly, Part II of
this article describes the main lines of routine information flow in
the consumer credit industry. Parts III and IV discuss the impact of
the CCPA on the two privacy issues identified above. Some final
thoughts are offered in Part V.
II.

INFORMATION FLOWS IN THE CONSUMER CREDIT INDUSTRY

The consumer credit process always involves at least two parties, the creditor and the potential borrower. Very often the process
also involves third parties such as credit reporting agencies. Information flows constantly among these parties, although in individual
cases the flow is concentrated at certain key points. In most cases,
the key points are the application process and the billing process."
The Application Process
All credit grantors attempt to evaluate the credit worthiness of
their applicants. To do this they need information. This information
is gathered right from the beginning of the credit relationship. Consumers themselves supply much of it in their credit applications.
For the most part, the creditor is free to ask for any information it
wants and then evaluate that information in any way it chooses.'
In the application, the creditor will typically ask the potential
borrower to divulge identifying information as well as information
pertaining to the borrower's employment, assets, and liabilities. Information about family members may also be requested. Even information about former family members may be requested if the applicant relies on income in the form of alimony or child support.6 This
L.J. 417 (1986).
4. There are other points where information may flow more rapidly. One of
these is the collection process. Here, however, the flow occurs on a case-by-case basis
rather than on a wholesale level. See PRIvAcY TREATISE, supra note *.
5. The general rule on applications is: "Except as provided [below], a creditor
may request any information in connection with an application." Federal Reserve
Board Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. 202.5(b)(1) (1985) (hereinafter cited as Reg. B]. The
rule on evaluation is: "Except as otherwise provided ....
a creditor may consider
any information obtained, so long as the information is not used to discriminate
against an applicant on a prohibited basis." Id. at 202.6(a).
6. See generally the model application forms published in Appendix B to Reg.
B, supra note 5. There are restrictions on the creditor's ability to gather information
about spouses and former spouses. Id. at 202.5(c) and (d).
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information helps the creditor in varying ways. The identifying information, for example, may include the applicant's social security
number. This helps the creditor avoid confusion when additional information is sought from credit reporting agencies.' Employment information is useful not only because it reveals income, but because it
suggests something about the applicant's stability. It also lets the
creditor know where the applicant can be found. Location information is extremely helpful in the debt collection process, should that
process ever be needed.' Financial information is gathered for obvious reasons. Because all this information serves a purpose in the
creditor's world, revealing it is nearly always a condition of getting
the loan.
In this sense, the inevitable loss of privacy involved in the application process can be said to be a voluntary trade-off for the privilege of receiving credit. But it has often been observed that
"[ciredit is essential for the vast majority of Americans." 9 As a result, these disclosures are not really voluntary in any meaningful
sense. The loss of privacy may be a trade-off, but it is also an unavoidable consequence of living in a credit-based economy.
The application form is rarely the end of the process. Creditors
routinely verify and supplement the information contained in the
application, typically through the use of credit reports. Developments in credit reporting technology have affected this process in
significant ways. For example, nearly all credit bureau files are now
fully automated. Creditors who are regular users of these files often
have computer terminals, provided by the credit bureaus, which permit direct access to credit bureau files. The creditor's loan officer
can electronically contact the credit bureau's computer and retrieve
the customer's entire file, all without leaving the desk and without
any human intervention at the credit bureau. 0
It seems likely that technological developments will soon permit
this system to work completely free of human interference. Many
large creditors use computerized credit scoring systems to evaluate
7. "[C]redit bureaus find the Social Security number a helpful tool for verifying
identity." Privacy Protection Study Comm'n, Personal Privacy in an Information
Society 61 (1977) (hereinafter cited as Privacy Commission Report].
8. See D. CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT

177 et seq. (1974). The federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15
U.S.C. § 1692 (1982), now prohibits direct contact with the debtor's employer and
most other third parties, and even direct contact with the debtor is restricted. Id. §
1692(c).

9. D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 8, at 41.
10. Systems of this type are described in Thompson v. San Antonio Retail
Merchants Ass'n, 682 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1982), and Lowry v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 444

F. Supp. 541 (N.D. Ga. 1978). See also Privacy Commission Report, supra note 7, at
63-4.
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their credit application." In these systems, credit worthiness is determined by weighing mathematically a group of personal characteristics which have been shown statistically to be reliable predictors of
the likelihood of repayment. The creditor may treat the score that
this process produces in different ways. In a single cut-off system,
for instance, the applicant's score is simply compared to a predetermined cut-off level. If the score is above this level, the application is
approved; if it is below, the application is denied. In two-stage systems, on the other hand, the score is compared to two predetermined levels. If the score is above the higher cut-off point, the application is granted; if it is below the lower cut-off point, it is denied. A
score falling between the two points indicates that more information
is needed. This additional information is normally obtained through
a credit report. The new information is then factored into the original score, and a final credit decision is based on the resulting new
score. In these cases, the creditor's computer presumably could be
programmed to contact the credit bureau's computer on its own
("Hello Eniac? This is Hal . . . "), retrieve the appropriate file, add
the new information to the consumer's application file, and rescore
the application.
The privacy ramifications of this sort of system are obvious. As
credit bureaus and credit grantors become more automated, information will be gathered more readily and shared more widely. In
addition, the trend is toward nation-wide systems.1 2 When these systems are in place, creditors, through their own computer terminals,
will have access not only to local files, but also to files of credit bureaus and other record-keepers across the nation.
The Billing Process
In traditional closed-end installment transactions, the flow of
information normally stops with the application process. After
credit has been approved, the only contact the parties are likely to
have is the debtor's monthly check.
In credit card and other open-end accounts, however, modern
billing practices create additional information flows. The activity in
11. For detailed discussions of credit scoring systems, see PRIVACY TREATISE,
supra note 1; Hsia, Credit Scoring and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 371 (1978); Capon, Credit Scoring Systems: A CriticalAnalysis, 46 J. MARKETING 82 (1982).
12. A decade and a half ago, one noted authority observed that "[tihe trend is
toward fully computerized credit bureau networks capable of maintaining an electronic file on every economically viable American." A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 76 (1971). The trend has not changed. A single credit reporting service, TRW
Credit Data, maintains computerized credit records on over 120 million United States
consumers. See Online Newsletter, February, 1986, at 2.

19861

Privacy Implications of Credit Laws

these accounts varies from month to month, and information is furnished to the consumer with each monthly statement. To inform the
consumer, creditors must gather and maintain detailed information
about each account.
Descriptive billing procedures now used by many, perhaps most,
major credit card issuers add to the information flow. Under these
procedures, the merchant bank truncates credit card sales slips, and
information about the transaction is routed electronically." When
this type of processing system is used, federal law now requires that
the card issuer include on the monthly statement the name of the
merchant and the city and state where each transaction took place,
along with the date and the amount. 1 4 When the card issuer is also
the merchant or a related person, as in the case of a department
store card, the monthly statement must also include a brief identification of the property or services purchased. 15 This can be quite personal; listed items may include such things as "jewelry," "sporting
goods," or "women's clothing." This information may help the consumer read and reconcile the monthly bill, but it also reveals a lot
about his or her personal affairs.
It is worth noting that comparable cash transactions do not produce comparable information flows. No personal information is disclosed to the consumer or maintained by the merchant. The advent
of machine-readable uniform product codes may produce cash register tapes which say things like "canned peaches," but in cash transactions the tapes are not identified with, nor are files maintained on,
individual customers.
The billing process also contributes to the exchange of information between creditors and third parties such as credit reporting
agencies. At the billing end of the credit cycle, however, the information flows in the other direction. Creditors routinely contribute
information about their customers' accounts to credit bureaus. In
fact, other than public records, these contributions constitute the
main sources of information which go into credit bureau files. Large
creditors with computer-based record-keeping systems simply supply their computer tapes each month, either to a central source to
which automated credit bureaus have direct access, or to local credit
bureaus directly. 6 The information is routed by coordinating customer ZIP codes with the ZIP code areas each local credit bureau
13. See N. PENNEY &
TEmS 19.0115] (1980).

D. BAKER,

THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFER SYS-

14. Federal Reserve Board Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. 226.8 (1985) [hereinafter
cited as Reg. Z].
15. Id.

16. Privacy Commission Report, supra note 7 at 47-8.
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1

serves. 7
III.

IMPACT ON INFORMATION GATHERING

Several provisions of the CCPA have an impact on the information gathering practices of the institutional players in the consumer
credit game. Some of these provisions affect the content of the specific information which can be gathered; others affect the uses to
which the information can be put. All affect the privacy of the consumers about whom the information pertains.
Rules on Discrimination
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA)' 8 is intended primarily to prevent discrimination in lending practices; it was never

intended to be a privacy statute. Nevertheless, the ECOA has
several privacy overtones, and a few of them relate to informationgathering practices.
The ECOA places very few restrictions on the types or amount
of information a creditor may gather and evaluate."9 This approach
would normally be expected to encourage the flow of information
about consumers. In at least one way, however, the ECOA restricts
this normal information flow and mandates a certain degree of creditor ignorance. A creditor may not ask a credit applicant to disclose
sex, race, color, religion, national origin, birth control practices, or
child-bearing plans.2s The anti-discrimination idea is that a creditor
is unlikely to discriminate on the basis of a personal characteristic it
does not even know exists. However, there is also a privacy benefit
to this policy. This very personal information is kept out of the
creditor's files, and, more importantly, out of the routine flow of information in the consumer credit industry.
The information-gathering policy in home mortgage transactions, on the other hand, takes back some of these privacy benefits.
Here, the creditor not only may, but is required to, ask the applicant's race or national origin, sex, marital status, and age. 2 ' The purpose of this requirement is to monitor compliance with the ECOA.
Enforcing agencies cannot detect patterns of discrimination unless
they know who is or is not receiving credit, and the monitoring rules
17. Id. Even those few credit bureaus that are not yet fully automated can participate in this system. The credit bureau trade organization, Associated Credit Bureaus, Inc., has developed a microfiche service permitting unautomated bureaus access to the same information. Id.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1982).
19. See supra note 5.
20. Reg. B., supra note 5, at 202.5(d) (3), (4), and (5).
21. Id. at 202.13.
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provide the necessary information. While the anti-discrimination
purpose is salutary, there is a privacy cost. The information will not
only be stored by the creditor, 2 it will also be made available to the
federal government and will doubtless become a part of some permanent file somewhere. There is an obvious tension here between
the statute's anti-discrimination goals and the individual applicant's
privacy interests.
There is some leavening in these monitoring provisions, however. The creditor is supposed to tell the applicant that the federal
government is requesting the information only for monitoring purposes. And even though the creditor is required to ask about race
a d the like, the applicant is not required to answer.2" It is not
known how many applicants refuse to divulge this information. If
the number is significant, presumably the government is getting a
distorted picture of the creditor's lending practices, and the compliance data would seem to be less than completely useful. The 1985
amendments to the relevant federal regulations will no doubt remove some of the distortion inherent in voluntary monitoring. Creditors are now required to note the applicant's race or national origin
and sex on the basis of visual observation or surname.2 4 Again, there
is a privacy trade-off.
Rules on Disclosure
Disclosure legislation such as the Truth in Lending Act
(TILA)25 is intended primarily to give consumers the transactional
information necessary for intelligent credit shopping. Creditors must
disclose a whole battery of specific information about credit costs
and other contract terms to individual consumers in each transaction. These disclosures are of several types. Some, such as the initial
disclosures required for open-end credit accounts, apply on a wholesale basis and set ground rules for the life of the account. Others,
such as periodic statements in open-end accounts and most disclosures in closed-end transactions, reflect specific information relevant
only to a particular transaction or series of transactions. In all cases,
however, the purpose is to provide appropriate information to consumers so that they can "avoid the uninformed use of credit."2
22. Creditors are required to retain most records pertaining to the ECOA for at
least 25 months. Id. at 202.12.
23. Id. at 202.13(c).
24. Id. at 202.13(b). The picture is further distorted by the fact that monitoring
is restricted to home mortgage loans.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1982).
26. Id. § 1601(a). Detailed discussion of the disclosure requirements of the
TILA is beyond the scope of this article. See generally R. ROHNER, THE LAW OF
TRUTH IN LENDING (1984).
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The Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA)27 follows the same
pattern for EFT accounts. Like the TILA, the EFTA requires financial institutions to disclose account information to consumers. The
EFTA applies only to accounts in which transfers of funds are initiated through electronic means, but the disclosures parallel those required for open-end credit accounts. These include a set of initial
disclosures of the general terms and conditions of the account, specific disclosures for individual transactions, and monthly or other
periodic statements reflecting cumulative activity. 8
These disclosure rules have important privacy implications. For
example, the TILA requires most major credit card issuers to use
the descriptive billing procedures described in part II. These procedures generate enormous quantities of information. This information becomes part of the creditor's permanent files, and it is available for government monitoring as well as dissemination to credit
reporting agencies and other third parties.29 The significant point is
that legal rules which benefit the consumer by providing more information also affect the consumer's privacy by increasing the information which is available to participants in the consumer credit process. "As a consequence [of these rules], credit-card issuers must
now capture and store more information on individual transactions
than they would otherwise record."8 0
Similar problems exist under the EFTA. For example, the
EFTA requires financial institutions to provide consumers with
written documentation of all transfers of funds initiated at any electronic terminal.8 ' This requirement applies equally to simple EFT
transactions like cash withdrawals from automated teller machines
and to more complex EFT transactions such as point of sale transfers. 2 As a result, banks and other EFT providers have had to develop the technology necessary to enable the terminals to generate
and print the required documentation. Today, most terminals supply little cards or other pieces of paper after the customer has completed the transaction. The documentation must include several specific items, including the amount and date of the transfer, the type
of transfer, the type of account involved (for example, "withdrawal
from checking" or "transfer from savings to checking"), a code
27.
28.

N.

15 U.S.C. § 1693 (1982). The EFTA isTitle IX of the CCPA.
For detailed treatment of the disclosure and other aspects of the EFTA, see

PENNEY

& D.

BAKER,

supra note 13.

29. TILA records must be kept at least two years, although regulatory agencies
may require longer retention. All records are available for inspection by the appropriate regulatory agency. Reg. Z, supra note 14, at 226.25.
30. Privacy Commission Report, supra note 7, at 46.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 1693(d).
32. For a description of these and other EFT systems, see PRIVACY TREATISE,
supra note 1.
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which identifies the customer or the access device used, the location
of the terminal, and the name of any third party to or from whom
funds are transferred.3 Many institutions provide additional information such as current account balances. It is worth noting that far
more information is generated in EFT transactions than in comparable transactions in which the consumer pays for goods or services
by check or cash.
The consumer benefit here is similar to that for credit card accounts. The consumer now has something resembling a receipt
which will help when it comes time to balance the checkbook. The
trade-off for this convenience is, as in the credit process, a diminishing sphere of privacy. The rule requiring documentation forces
banks and other financial institutions to create records and information flows in many cases where none existed before. Current technology permits these records to be easily stored and retrieved.
Because the law requires much of this documentation to be provided on the spot, many EFT transactions raise another privacy implication. This grows out of the fact that EFT systems operate increasingly on-line and in real time. 4 This makes it possible to locate
individuals whenever and wherever they conduct financial transactions. Even the trail of records produced in off-line systems makes it
relatively easy to reconstruct the activities of most people.35 However, in on-line systems, it will be possible for anyone who has access, including law enforcement agencies, not only to know where
consumers were when they conducted particular transactions, but to
know where they are.
Piecemeal documentation for individual EFT transactions is
only part of the information flow; periodic statements add to the
burden. For checking accounts which have EFT features, most financial institutions simply combine the required disclosures with
the traditional monthly bank statement. The information required
for periodic EFT statements is similar to that required for documentation at the terminals in individual transactions. 6 In the periodic statement, however, the information flow is increased because
the information must be gathered and disclosed for every electronic
transaction which took place during the month, not just for those
that were initiated at electronic terminals. Again, while these disclosure rules help the consumer in some ways, their privacy costs
should not be overlooked.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 1693(d) (a).
34. One study has predicted that by 1995, all banking transactions will be posed
in real time. See Greguras, EFT and Privacy, 26 SECURITY MGMT. 24, 25 (1982) (citing a study by Electronic Banking, Inc., of Atlanta).
35. See A. MILLER, supra note 12, at 8.
36. The disclosure requirements are spelled out in 15 U.S.C. § 1693(d)(c).
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IMPACT ON CONSUMER ACCESS

Among the most important consumer privacy rights is the right
of access to records. The consumer needs some way to discover the
existence of records, to learn of disclosures which have been made,
and to discover and correct errors. The CCPA has a few provisions
which permit consumer access to certain financial institutions'
records. Unlike the rules discussed in part III with respect to information gathering, however, the CCPA provisions on consumer access
have, for the most part, a positive privacy effect. The main problem
is that there are not enough of them, and those which do exist are
remarkably weak.
Learning of Records
Before a consumer can obtain access to records maintained on
him, he must know that the records exist. When the consumer has a
direct relationship with an institution, the problem is easy. The consumer is likely to know whether he has a credit card or a bank account, and if he wants to see his records he knows where to start
looking.
Records held by third-party institutions, however, are another
matter. The individual consumer ordinarily has no direct contact
with credit reporting agencies or credit card authorization services,
for example, and he may not be aware of the detailed records these
institutions keep. Business debtors and sophisticated consumers
may know that their creditors routinely use credit reports, and curious credit card users or check writers may suspect that records exist
when a skeptical merchant makes a phone call or consults a
notebook before accepting payment. But not everyone is this aware,
and there should be a place for laws requiring that record-keeping
practices be made known.
With respect to consumer financial records that private institutions keep, there are few such laws. Only two parts of the CCPA
address this problem, and then only in a limited fashion. First, the

FCRA provides that when a potential creditor relies on information
contained in a credit report either to deny credit or to increase the
charge the creditor must disclose to the consumer the name and address of the reporting agency who issued the report.37 In addition,
the ECOA requires that a creditor provide the consumer with specific reasons for denial of credit or for any other adverse action.3" If
those reasons include a bad credit report, then this must be
37.
38.

15 U.S.C. § 1681(m).
Id. § 1691(d).
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disclosed."
While these provisions are significant, they have serious shortcomings. The most important is that they apply only when the
credit applicant is turned down or otherwise treated adversely. If
credit is granted on the terms the applicant requests, the creditor is
not required to disclose the fact that a credit report or other outside
source of information was used in the decision-making process. 0
Learning of Disclosures
Individual consumers rarely learn of the information sharing
and disclosure practices described in Part II of this article. Statutes
requiring that consumers be told about credit reports when adverse
decisions are made solve only a small part of the problem. Absent a
statute or a fiduciary relationship, it is unclear whether an institution is obligated to tell the consumer what disclosures it has made.
While the bank-customer relationship may be considered fiduciary
for some purposes, 41 in general the debtor-creditor relationship is
not a fiduciary one. Moreover, there are few applicable statutes. The
FCRA requires that credit reporting agencies disclose to the consumer, on request, the identity of anyone who has been furnished a
credit report during the preceding six months. 42 To keep fully informed of all credit reports issued on him, a consumer would have to
check with the credit bureau every six months. This is hardly feasible, and it is no substitute for a law which requires that consumers
be notified of all disclosures made about them.
Credit reports are only part of the information picture, and
other kinds of disclosures are harder to discover. As discussed above,
many creditors routinely share their computer tapes with credit bureaus. In addition, credit card issuers routinely disclose information
about their customers to independent card authorization services. Further, merchants disclose customer information to checkauthorization services and check-guarantee services.4 8 These so39. Reg. B., supra note 5, at Appendix C.
40. A different rule applies if a so-called investigative consumer report was
used. The institution must tell the consumer that it has requested the report and that
the consumer is entitled to further information about it. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(d)(a). This
rule will not have much impact on consumer awareness in the credit process, however, since in industry practice investigative reports are used primarily by insurance
companies, and rarely by creditors. For a general discussion of investigative reports,

see

PRIVACY TREATISE

supra note *.

41. See generally Symons, The Bank-Customer Relation: Part I-The Relevance of Contract Doctrine, 100 BANKING L.J. 220 (1983); and Symons, The BankCustomer Relation: Part I-The Judicial Decision, 100 BANKING L.J. 325 (1983).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(g)(a)(3).
43. For a discussion of these practices, see PRIVACY TREATISE supra note *
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called bad check lists have been held to be within the FCRA," and
as a result customers can exercise their rights under the FCRA and
discover disclosures which may have been made. The FCRA probably covers independent card authorization services as well.' 5 But

having statutory rights does not help if the customer does not know
that the record exists, and this is not likely."6 In fact, with the sole

exception of adverse decisions under the FCRA and the ECOA,
record-keepers are not generally required to reveal disclosures which
have been made to others. This is one of the major weaknesses of
the law of financial privacy.
There has been some recent progress in this area. The EFTA
requires that financial institutions disclose to their customers the
circumstances under which they will "in the ordinary course of business disclose information concerning the consumer's account to
third persons.'4 7 While this is not quite a full disclosure rule, it is a
step in the right direction. This provision is limited, however, to
consumer EFT accounts. No comparable provisions exist under the
TILA or elsewhere for open-end credit accounts or non-EFT depository accounts.
TRW Credit Data, the nation's largest consumer credit data
holder, has taken a more interesting private step toward full access
and disclosure. For a fee of $30 a year, consumers will receive a
password which will permit direct, on-line access to their own credit
files. In addition, for the same fee, consumers will be notified whenever anyone receives a credit report on them." While this service
may benefit only those consumers who have access to a personal
computer and who would think to look in TRW's files in the first
place, it is a start.
Access to Records
Access to financial records which are maintained about individuals is an important attribute of privacy. As the Privacy Commission has noted, "[fror the individual, necessary fairness protections
44. Greenway v. Information Dynamics, Ltd., 399 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Ariz. 1974),
a/I'd per curiam, 524 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1975); Peasley v. Telecheck of Kansas, Inc.,
6 Kan. App. 2d 990, 637 P.2d 437 (1981).
45. The FCRA specifically excludes "in-house" authorizations, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a)(d)(3)(B), and the implication is that independent services are covered. The
F.T.C. has noted the distinction between in-house and independent authorization services. See F.T.C., Compliance with the Fair Credit Reporting Act 1973 & rev. 1977,
1979, reprinted in 5 CCH Cons. Cred. Guide 11,301 et seq.
46. The Privacy Commission noted that "(it is doubtful ... that many of the
[credit] card holders on whom an independent service reports derogatory information
- . .know that it exists." Privacy Commission Report, supra note 7, at 45.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1693(c)(a)(9).
48. Online Newsletter, supra note 12, at 2.
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include a right of access to records about himself for the purpose of
reviewing, copying, and correcting or amending them as necessary
.... ,,41
Unfortunately, the law regarding customer access does not
measure up to this lofty standard.
With respect to primary institutions such as creditors and
banks, there is no law which provides for customer access to financial records. The disclosures required to be made in monthly statements for open-end credit accounts and EFT accounts provide some
information, as do the disclosures the ECOA requires for adverse
decisions. But these rules do not adequately substitute for a right of
access. The individual consumer is not entitled to see a credit grantor's files to learn the actual items of information behind an adverse
credit decision or even to learn generally what information is kept
on him. And no law gives a customer the right to see information a
depository institution maintains or which may have been used as the
basis for an adverse depository decision. The Privacy Commission
recommended that creditor and depository institution files be
opened up to consumers,5 0 but no law on this subject has been
enacted.
With respect to third-party institutions such as credit reporting
agencies, the only federal law specifically permitting consumer access is the FCRA. 1 The rights provided here are significant, yet they
suffer from many weaknesses. Perhaps the most significant is that
the agency must disclose only the "nature and substance" 52 of the
information in its files. This standard means that agencies need not
provide customers with copies of their credit reports or other information in their files nor, indeed, even let the consumer see any of
the file information."3 This standard has been widely criticized, and
even the credit bureau trade association has recognized that a disclosure limited to the "nature and substance" of a file can cause
anxiety and uncertainty for the individual. 4 Many credit bureaus go
beyond the minimum statutory requirement and provide copies of
credit reports or other information to the consumers, as the described TRW service indicates. But these extra disclosures are
purely voluntary. The Privacy Commission recommended that the
law be changed in a way that would require credit reporting agencies
to allow an individual to see and copy any recorded information
about that individual.55 This change has never been made.
49. Privacy Commission Report, supra note 7, at 17-18.
50. See id. at 77, 109.
51. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(g). For a general discussion of this provision, see PRIVACY
TREATISE supra note *.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(g)(a).
53. See Equifax Services, Inc. v. Lamb, 621 S.W.2d 28 (Ky. App. 1981).
54. Privacy Commission Report, supra note 7, at 80.
55. Id. at 81.
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The "nature and substance" standard, while weak, is not worthless. In many cases, seeing an actual credit report might do little
good for the average consumer since most reports are made in a
standardized format consisting mainly of coded references only
trained personnel can decipher.5 The FCRA even helps here by requiring that the reporting agency "provide trained personnel to explain to the consumer any information furnished to him.

'5 7

In addi-

tion, the individual may bring along "one other person of his
choosing"5 8 when he visits the agency. This person, of course, could
be a lawyer or other confidant who is not bashful about asking pertinent questions. Finally, even within the limits of the "nature and
substance" standard, the agency must cooperate. Credit reporting
agencies have been held liable for punitive damages for systematically blocking the consumer's access and for providing only incomplete synopses of the consumer's record.59
Correcting Inaccuracies
The final aspect of consumer access is the right to challenge and
correct inaccuracies which appear in institutional files containing
personal financial information. The CCPA addresses this issue in
three separate places. As with other provisions on access, these provisions offer some protection for consumer privacy interests; the
trouble is that they do not go far enough.
Credit Reporting Agency Files
The FCRA establishes procedures to be followed in cases in
which the consumer, having discovered the "nature and substance"
of the information in his file, disputes its accuracy. The first step is
reinvestigation, which the agency is required to undertake."0 The
statute does not say what sort of reinvestigation is required. At the
very least, the agency should verify the disputed information with
its original source. If the dispute concerns a credit account, for example, a call to the creditor may clarify the problem. Also, if the
consumer provides independent sources to support his version of the
56. Form "Crediscope 2000" was devised in 1977 by Associated Credit Bureaus,
Inc., the trade association, to standardize credit reporting practices. Information flyers describing the format are available from ACB and from most credit bureaus. For
an example of the types of problems which can be generated by this format, see
Koropoulos v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 734 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(h)(c).

58. Id. § 1681(h)(d).
59. See, e.g., Millstone v. O'Hanlon Reports, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 269 (E.D. Mo.
1974), aff'd 528 F.2d 829 (8th Cir. 1976).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(i)(a). The agency need not reinvestigate, however, if "it has

reasonable grounds to believe that the dispute ... is frivolous or irrelevant." Id.
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story, the agency would be wise to contact them as well. More than
one reinvestigation may be necessary."
If reinvestigation does not resolve the dispute, the consumer has
the right to file with the reporting agency a statement of his own
explaining the nature of the dispute.2 While this helps, there are
two limitations which make this procedure less than completely satisfactory. First, there is no requirement that the agency reveal the
consumer's right to do this,68 although many agencies do. Second,
the agency may limit the statement to one hundred words if it provides the consumer with help in writing it."' If the consumer does
file such a statement, the agency must clearly note in any subsequent report that the information is disputed. Along with the report it must also provide either the consumer's statement or "a clear
and accurate codification or summary thereof."" The agency is relieved of these duties, however, if it has reasonable grounds to believe that the statement is frivolous or irrelevant.6 7 Otherwise, if the
consumer has filed a statement, it is a violation of the FCRA for the
agency to fail to send it. 8
Finally, in any case involving disputed accuracy, the agency is
required, at the consumer's request, to notify any person who received a report containing the disputed information within the previous six months. The notice must state that the item has been deleted, if that is the case, or include the consumer's statement of the
dispute. The agency is required to tell the consumer of his right to
make this request.66 Whether these notices cause many credit grantors to reevaluate adverse decisions is not known; but this procedure,
as limp as it is, does contribute to the goal of accuracy and fairness
in financial record keeping.
Billing Disputes
Billing practices used in open-end credit accounts were described above. Errors may appear, or consumers may dispute
charges or other items which appear on the monthly statement. The
Fair Credit Billing Act (FCBA) 70 provides a mechanism for dealing
with these errors and misunderstandings. While it would serve no
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Dynes v. TRW Credit Data, 652 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1981).
15 U.S.C. § 1681(i)(b).
Roseman v. Retail Credit Co., 428 F. Supp. 643 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
15 U.S.C. § 1681(i)(b).
Id. § 1681(i)(c).

66.

Id.

67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. No standards are provided for determining frivolity or irrelevance.
Alexander v. Moore & Associates, 553 F. Supp. 948 (D. Haw. 1982).
15 U.S.C. § 1681(i)(d).
Id. § 1666 (1982). The FCBA is part of the Truth in Lending Act.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 19:941

purpose to describe the mechanics of these provisions, 71 it should be
noted that the FCBA has several important privacy features, mostly
positive. Indeed, the very existence of a statutory right to challenge
the accuracy of information contained in the creditor's file, at least
in so far as it appears on a billing statement, is itself an important
privacy development. Under the FCBA, the creditor is required to
provide the consumer with a summary of these rights in the initial
disclosure statement," and every monthly statement must contain
an address the consumer can use to give the creditor notice of any
alleged error.7
Another important privacy feature appears during the time any
billing dispute is pending. The consumer has the right to withhold
payment of the disputed portion of the bill, and the creditor may
not make or threaten to make an adverse credit report because of
the consumer's failure to pay this portion. 74 This protects against
the accumulation of extraneous and possibly erroneous information
in the consumer's files. This is an important provision apart from its
privacy benefit, since even a threat of an adverse credit report could
intimidate the consumer into paying. This would seriously dilute the
right to withhold payment. Further, this right applies in situations
in which the consumer's real dispute is .with the merchant and the
consumer is exercising his right to assert defenses against the card
issuer by withholding payment.7" Even here, the card issuer may not
report the disputed amount as delinquent until the dispute is set76
tled or judgment is rendered.
The concern over adverse credit reports is so' great that a special rule was included in the FCBA to cover cases in which the consumer is unsatisfied with the resolution of the dispute. If the consumer gives a second notice that an error still exists or that the same
item is still in dispute, the creditor may not report the account as
delinquent unless it also reports it as being in dispute. If the creditor does this, it must also give the consumer written notice of the
names and addresses of everyone to whom the creditor makes this
report, and it must follow up by reporting any subsequent resolution
to the same persons.7 7 The creditor need not, however, reinvestigate
the error following a second notice of the same dispute.
71.
LENDING

72.
repeated
73.
74.

Detailed treatment can be found in R. ROHNER, THE LAW OF TRUTH IN
ch. 9 (1984).
Reg. Z, supra note 14, at 226.6(d) and 226.9(a). This disclosure must be
at least annually. Id.
Id. at 226.7(k).
Id. at 226.13(d)(2). See Saunders v. Ameritrust of Cincinnati, 587 F. Supp.

896 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
75. See 15 U.S.C. § 1666(i).
76. Reg. Z. supra note 14, at 226.12(c)(2).
77. Id. 226.13(g).
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Errors in EFT Accounts
The EFTA contains error resolution procedures which apply to
errors or disputes in periodic statements sent with EFT accounts."'
The procedures and the privacy impacts are similar to those for
open-end accounts under the FCBA, and no separate discussion is
required. 79 It is again worth noting the limitations, however. EFT
accounts are normally deposit accounts to which certain EFT privileges apply. No dispute resolution procedures exist for ordinary,
non-EFT deposit accounts, or for closed-end credit transactions."0
V.

CONCLUSION

Consumer credit protection laws like the CCPA constitute a
mixed privacy bag. In many respects, as in the access and error resolution procedures, the CCPA has added significantly to the privacy
rights of consumers. But in other important ways, the overriding
concern for disclosure increases the privacy risks to individual consumers by increasing the flow of information in the consumer credit
process. These privacy implications are often hidden. In most cases,
consumers are probably unaware of the extent to which personal information about them is passed around in the industry. While much,
probably most, of this information flow is unavoidable, there is need
for a mechanism which would make consumers aware of the privacy
costs. Perhaps the disclosure laws need to disclose this as well.

78. 15 U.S.C. at § 1693(f).
79. For a detailed discussion, see N. PENNEY & D. BAKER, supra note 13, at
12.02.
80. See Jacobs v. Marine Midland Bank, 124 Misc. 2d 162, 475 N.Y.S.2d 1003
(Sup. Ct. 1984).

